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Abstract: This paper discusses two models for economic development of the 
automotive industry in the Indonesian Jabotabek region. The Keiretsu model 
combines access to Japanese knowledge with dependence on Japanese MNEs. 
To become less vulnerable in the global economy, the region needs to develop 
a capacity for indigenous growth based on interactive learning between 
regional firms. This corresponds to the Learning Region model. However, the 
hierarchical nature of the Keiretsu networks and the dependence of Indonesian 
firms on Japanese MNEs challenge the feasibility of this strategy. The paper 
thus raises the questions of the applicability of the Learning Region for 
developing economies. 
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1 Introduction 
The Java automotive industry is one of the drivers of the developing Indonesian 
economy. The industry is predominantly clustered in the Jabotabek region of West Java, 
which corresponds to the provinces of Jawa Barat and DKI Jakarta. The industry is 
heavily dominated by Japanese automotive firms. US and European carmakers play a 
marginal role at best. Six Japanese brands have a market share of just under 90% in 
Indonesia.1 Consequently, Japanese carmakers were able to impose their traditional 
Keiretsu system as the basis for the Indonesian automotive industry. The Keiretsu brings 
with it a model of economic development that follows hierarchical lines based on  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the Japanese parent companies. Evidence of this 
development model is abundantly present in the Indonesian automotive industry from the 
1970s onwards. More recently, however, the Indonesian government has tried to further 
the economic development of the Jabotabek region based on strengthening the local 
Indonesian automotive firms; a development model that bears some resemblance to the 
Learning Region. This results a tension in the Indonesian automotive industry between, 
on the one hand, the top-down development strategy of the Keiretsu and, on the other 
hand, the indigenous growth development strategy of the Learning Region. 
In today’s knowledge-based economy, economic development of firms and regions 
alike depends on the creation, dissemination and application of knowledge in new or 
improved products, services and processes (Rutten, 2003; Morgan, 2004). The above 
models of economic development reflect two very different ways of initiating knowledge 
creation, dissemination and application in a region. The Keiretsu model is a model where 
knowledge developed outside the region gets transferred to regional firms through FDI. 
This model can give a region quick and easy access to knowledge; however, it does little 
to further regional knowledge production. Yet the capacity for indigenous knowledge 
production is deemed vital for regional economic development in the economic 
geography literature (Boschma, 2004; Morgan, 2004; Lorenzen, 2008). Developing a 
regional knowledge production capacity as the basis of regional economic development 
is the aim of the Learning Region (Morgan, 1997; Rutten and Boekema, 2007a). 
Learning Regions have the capacity to generate indigenous growth, that is economic 
growth based on the skills and competences (i.e. knowledge) of its own firms. Regional 
networks of firms and their connections to knowledge centres are at the heart of a 
Learning Region’s capacity for indigenous growth. But also its capacity for institutional 
learning and resulting regional development policies are a crucial element of a Learning 
Region (Morgan, 1997; Hudson, 1999; Rutten and Boekema, 2007a). Obviously, the 
more developed the regional networks and capacity for institutional learning, the better 
the prospects for indigenous regional development. The problem for a developing 
economy such as Indonesia is that it falls short on precisely those characteristics, 
compared to developed economies. Therein lies the above-mentioned tension. 
This paper explores the strengths and weaknesses of the two development models for 
the automotive industry in the Jabotabek region, taking into account the nature of this 
region as a developing economy. The remainder of this section discusses some key 
figures on the Indonesian automotive industry. The next section discusses how the 
Japanese Keiretsu system has been helpful in furthering economic development in the 
Indonesian automotive industry, but how it also hampers further development. The two  
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following sections discuss the difficulties that the Jabotabek region faces regarding the  
adoption of a Learning Region based development model. The final section summarises 
the key arguments of this paper and presents a conclusion regarding the Learning Region 
as a development model for the automotive industry in the Jabotabek region. 
The growth of the automotive industry in the Jabotabek region is largely based on the 
growth of domestic demand for motor vehicles. This growth has been considerable in the 
1990s and 2000s because of Indonesia’s rising standard of living, but it is also vulnerable 
to international economic developments, such as the most recent economic crisis that 
originated in the USA in 2008. As a result of this crisis, the Indonesian market for motor 
vehicles decreased from 603,774 units in 2008 to 483,548 units in 2009. Similar drops 
were observed in other ASEAN countries, to which Indonesia exports automotive parts 
and subassemblies, and Indonesia’s share in the ASEAN automotive market dropped 
from 28.6% in 2008 to 25.4% in 2009, thus nullifying the steady growth of market share 
in previous years (26.0% in 2005).2 This downfall strengthened the commitment of the 
Indonesian government to its policy of indigenous development of the automotive 
industry (MOSR, 2002; MOTIRI, 2005). The importance of the automotive industry for 
Indonesia is substantial. Between 2005 and 2008 employment in this sector more than 
doubled. By comparison, employment in total manufacturing ‘only’ doubled while total 
employment grew just under 60%. These growth rates, of course, reflect the developing 
nature of the Indonesian economy. Employment in the automotive industry is 8% of 
manufacturing employment and 6.4% of total employment (see www.oica.net/category/ 
economic-contributions/auto-jobs/). According to the OICA website (International 
Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers), Indonesia counts some 64,000 auto  
jobs (figures for 2007) (see www.oica.net/category/economic-contributions/auto-jobs/). 
Indonesian figures, unfortunately, are somewhat ambiguous. Jawa Barat and DKI Jakarta 
seem to be the only two provinces that report establishments and employment in the 
automotive industry. The total number of employees in this sector for both regions totals 
55,672 in 2005. However, DKI Jakarta reports figures for medium and large enterprises 
only, while Jawa Barat seems to include figures from small companies as well. National 
data report that Indonesia counted 262 establishments in the automotive industry in 2005. 
The combined figures for Jawa Barat and DKI Jakarta total 163, but again, small  
firms seem to be omitted from the Jakarta data (see Table 1). The conclusion thus  
seems justified that the Indonesian automotive industry is an (almost) exclusively 
Jabotabek region affair. Therefore, in this paper the ‘Indonesian automotive industry’ is 
synonymous with the ‘automotive industry in the Jabotabek region’. 
Table 1 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers industry in Jabotabek and Indonesia (2005) 
 Jawa Barat DKI Jakarta Jabotabek Regiona Indonesia 
Employment 29,137 26,535 55,672 64,000b 
Establishments 128 35c 163c 262 
Notes: aJabotabek = Jawa Barat + DKI Jakarta; bOICA figure for 2007; cDKI Jakarta 
figure is exclusive small enterprises. 
Sources: Statistics Indonesia, Statistics Jakarta, Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa 
Barat, OICA (see also www.dds.bps.go.id) 
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2 The Japanese Keiretsu: top-down development 
The Keiretsu is the traditional business model of the Japanese manufacturing industry.  
It is basically a system of vertical integration through long-term supplier networks  
and shared network norms. The Keiretsu model ensures top-down control over the 
network for the network’s dominant manufacturer. The Keiretsu was designed for lean 
production, that is efficiency, and it lacks decentralised and diffused design capabilities 
(Gerlach, 1992; Best, 2001). In this paper, Keiretsu refers to the Japanese-led networks in 
the Indonesian automotive industry. The various Japanese carmakers in Indonesia, such 
as Toyota, Nissan and Mitsubishi, each have their own Keiretsu of tightly controlled 
vertical networks of Indonesian suppliers and subcontractors, and these firms are not 
likely to work for companies outside their own Keiretsu (Irawati, 2009). Originally 
confined to the Japanese mainland, the carmakers have expended their Keiretsu to 
included subcontractors elsewhere in Southeast Asia from the 1970s onwards. Initially, 
the internationalisation of the Keiretsu was intended as a cost-cutting strategy to benefit 
from low-cost manufacturers in the developing economies of Southeast Asia. Currently, 
Keiretsu development follows a more knowledge-based approach (Irawati and Charles, 
2010). 
From a theoretical perspective, the Keiretsu may be seen as an example of network 
governance, where the network is viewed as a mechanism of coordination (Provan and 
Kenis, 2008). The key benefit of network governance compared to markets or hierarchies 
is that networks simultaneously allow for flexibility and control (Piore and Sable, 1984; 
Larson, 1992). Networks are a form of social organisation and they vary greatly with 
regard to their structural pattern of relations (Provan and Kenis, 2008), and different 
types of networks emphasise different forms of governance (Uzzi, 1997). The Keiretsu is 
an example of lead-organisation governance and is characterised by centralised decision-
making and asymmetrical power relations (Best, 2001; Irawati, 2009). Network relations 
are predominantly top-down with the lead organisation, in this case, the Japanese 
carmaker clearly being the hub in the network. Lower order network members have few 
direct relations. Instead, they communicate through higher order brokers. The 
hierarchical nature of this type of network reduces the need to develop network-level 
competences. An important coordination mechanism in this type of network follows from 
the dependency of the network members on the lead organisation. Loyalty becomes more 
important than trust and goal consensus (Best, 1990; Gerlach, 1992; Gerlach and Lincoln, 
1992; Provan and Kenis, 2008). For Japanese carmakers, the Keiretsu is a means to 
reduce several kinds of uncertainties by creating a hierarchical network of subsidiaries, 
subcontractors and suppliers around them, while at the same time, staying firmly in 
control. This is a key difference between the Japanese automotive industry, on the one 
hand, and its US and European counterparts, on the other hand, where horizontal network 
relations play a far more dominant role (Best, 1990; Gerlach and Lincoln, 1992; Best, 
2001).  
The benefits of this strategy for the Japanese carmakers are clear. It allows them to 
spread the costs and risks of doing business in a highly competitive and uncertain world 
(Gwyne, 1990; Gerlach and Lincoln, 1992; Hatch and Yamamura, 1996; Ozawa, 2005). 
Subordinate firms, in turn, receive access to capital, technology, managerial know-how 
and markets through their liaison with the large maker. The key incentive for smaller 
firms to become part of a Keiretsu lies in the long-term nature of Keiretsu relations, 
which offers them much more certainty than market relations do. The Keiretsu, thus, 
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enables subordinate firms to upgrade their performance levels, which in turn benefits the 
lead firm. The international expansion of the Keiretsu follows the Japanese ‘flying geese 
paradigm’, where economically disparate regions achieve complementarities or divisions 
of labour (Ozawa, 2005). Initially Southeast Asian Keiretsu members performed the  
role of low-cost producers, but their gradually upgraded performances levels now allow 
them to play more sophisticated roles as well. This is also the case in the Indonesian 
automotive industry. From the 1990s onward, the Jabotabek region has developed from  
a ‘workbench’ for the Japanese carmakers to a regional production centre which exports 
to other countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Nonetheless, 
Japanese domination of the Indonesia automotive industry is a strong as ever. For 
example, the Keiretsu have “established a partially internalized market for intermediate 
products” (Gerlach and Lincoln, 1992, p.493), which results in stable, long-term network 
relations (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996; Ozawa, 2005). The price for this stability is 
Japanese dominance of the Indonesian firms. This domination, or vertical quasi-
integration, of the Keiretsu does preclude competition, though. On the one hand, there is 
rivalry between the Indonesian automotive firms within the semi-internalised markets of 
their Keiretsu. On the other hand, the Jabotabek region competes with other automotive 
industry regions in Southeast Asia (Ernst, 1994; Gereffi et al., 2005; Fujimoto, 2007; 
Irawati and Charles, 2010). 
The key to understanding Japanese domination of the Indonesian automotive industry 
lies in the development path followed by the Japanese carmakers, which resulted in their 
technological and managerial knowledge becoming pivotal in their respective Keiretsu. 
Initially, in the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese carmakers established transplants in the 
Jabotabek region, that is companies owned and managed by their Japanese parent 
companies and employing production technology transferred from the parent companies. 
The transplants served as ‘workbenches’ for their parent companies, which achieved cost 
benefits in return (Ozawa, 2005; Irawati, 2009). In the following stages, Japanese 
carmakers started to outsource production to local subsidiaries and subcontractors. In 
order to bring these Indonesian companies up to Japanese standards, these local firms 
received managerial, organisational and technological knowledge transfer from  
the Japanese carmakers (Irawati and Charles, 2010). The knowledge transfer from the 
Japanese carmakers comes with long-term commitments that effectively incorporate the 
local firms into the Keiretsu of ‘their’ respective carmakers. The resulting dependency of 
the Indonesian firms on their Japanese ‘bosses’ can hardly be underestimated (Sato, 
2001). Technologically they are committed to use precisely calibrated tools and dies for 
the production of the parts and subassemblies that their carmaker has outsourced to them. 
To operate this often sophisticated equipment, the Indonesian firms have to make 
substantial investments in highly specific job training programmes for their employees 
(Hatch and Yamamura, 1996; Pries and Schweer, 2004; Irawati, 2009). The resulting 
asset specificity and sunk costs for the subordinate Indonesian firms make it increasingly 
unattractive for them to work for other MNEs or even to shirk or exert less than the 
maximum effort in order not to jeopardise the relationship with their Japanese ‘parent’. 
Upsetting the Japanese ‘parent’ brings the real danger that the relationship will be 
terminated which will drastically reduce the value of the investments and the assets of 
local Indonesian firm (Doner, 1991; Chen, 1996; Hatch and Yamamura, 1996; Honda, 
2004; Toyota, 2007). Also the aspect of loyalty needs to be considered as a part of the 
Keiretsu relations. Loyalty plays a different role in an Asian context than it does in a 
Western context (Gerlach and Lincoln, 1992) and it is yet another mechanism through 
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which Japanese carmakers can exercise control over their Indonesian subordinates. It is a 
far more subtle but therefore no less effective control mechanism than organisational, 
managerial, technological and legal control mechanisms. Western firms are 
uncomfortable in a business regime that runs so much on long-standing personal 
relationships rather than on clearly established legal guidelines (Best, 1990; Gerlach, 
1992; Chen, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). The resulting coordinated deployment of resources in the 
Keiretsu, in particular, managerial and technological knowledge transfer allows the 
parent firm to capture more firmly the gains from its resources. Knowledge spillovers are 
largely intentional and internal to the Keiretsu. Knowledge spillovers outside the 
Keiretsu are far less frequent compared to the less hierarchical networks of US and 
European carmakers (Busser and Sadoi, 2004). Production alliances in the Keiretsu are 
also far more exclusionary than those in US and European automotive networks. In 
combination with importance of personal relations, it makes Southeast Asia a difficult to 
penetrate market for US and European carmakers, rendering Japan a heavily dominant 
position in this part of the world. 
In general, the benefits from the Keiretsu that have accrued to Indonesian firms and 
the Jabotabek region are substantial. In the first place, the movement of the Japanese 
carmakers into the Indonesian automotive industry has resulted in a considerable direct 
and indirect job growth. The automotive companies in the Jabotabek region have seen 
their employment levels increase since the 1970s, and many new companies have been 
established in this industry. In turn, this has triggered employment growth in other 
sectors in the Jabotabek region as well. The automotive industry is now one of the 
economic pillars of this region (MOSR, 2002; MOTIRI, 2005). Second, the Japanese FDI 
have exposed the region to new technologies and innovation in the automotive industry, 
which has hastened the catching-up process of this developing economy (Irawati and 
Charles, 2010). The capacity for indigenous growth, although heavily path-dependent on 
Japanese carmakers and their organisational, managerial and technological knowledge, is 
much greater than it would otherwise have been (Rasiah, 2005). Third, the acquiring of 
products from indigenous firms by Japanese automotive affiliates has increased the sales 
and innovation of these indigenous firms. In other words, the downward linkages have 
produced considerable economic gains that have benefited not only suppliers in the 
automotive industry, but also related industries and the wider regional economy (Rasiah, 
2005). 
In sum, the Indonesian automotive industry and in its wake the Jabotabek region have 
developed favourably under the wings of the Japanese Keiretsu. The automotive firms in 
this region are increasingly capable of producing complex parts and subassemblies, 
which give them a better competitive edge compared to their counterparts elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia. The Jabotabek region now exports parts and subassemblies to other 
Japanese-controlled automotive regions in Southeast Asia, and ties are starting to form 
between Indonesian subcontracts to work on product development and innovation, albeit 
within the context of the export and innovation needs of their Keiretsu. Consequently, the 
Indonesian automotive industry can function as an engine, transforming the low-wage, 
labour-intensive, inward-looking economy of the Jabotabek region in a higher wage, 
technology-intensive, export-oriented economy. However, it comes at a price. The 
Keiretsu model has a negative impact on the development of local linkages which stifles 
local initiatives and the potential for indigenous growth. Moreover, the Indonesian 
automotive industry is vulnerable to international demand and supply conditions, and on 
Japanese response to them. 
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3 Regional economic development of the Jabotabek region 
The world financial crisis that started in 2008 is not the first to affect the Indonesian 
automotive industry. Following the Asian financial crisis some ten years earlier, the 
Indonesian government initiated its ‘Industrial Growth 2025’ programme, which aims to 
establish high-tech industry as prime mover of the national economy. The automotive 
industry was heavily targeted in this programme, which resulted in the establishing of an 
industrial district in the Jabotabek region (MOSR, 2002; MOTIRI, 2005; Irawati, 2009). 
The industrial district should provide the necessary physical and knowledge infrastructure, 
research centres and intermediary services in a one location at reasonable costs. 
Following 1989 regulations, automotive companies must now locate in selected industrial 
estates across Java, and the Jabotabek region has been by far their most popular region of 
choice. The clustering of automotive companies in this region has facilitated the growth 
of a network of support activities, such as knowledge centres, intermediary organisations, 
government agencies and financial services. The clustering of automotive firms in this 
region also allows them to reap the benefits of spatial proximity with regard to 
knowledge exchange, trust-building and the development of shared norms and customs 
that facilitate social and business interaction (Morgan, 2004; DuPuy and Torre, 2006). 
The Jabotabek region thus seems to have the critical mass that is necessary if an industry 
is to carry regional economic development (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999; Gertler and 
Wolfe, 2006). The scale of the Indonesian automotive industry is the first element of the 
critical mass. During the 2000s, Indonesia has developed into a substantial player in 
Southeast Asia. Second, the number of firms in this sector is very substantial and 
encourages competition, particularly between Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) who form the supplier base. Third, development and dissemination of technology 
and innovations goes faster in larger clusters of firms as R&D funding and absorptive 
capacity are larger. Finally, networking is easier in larger clusters of firms since the 
changes of finding competent complementary partners are greater (Porter, 1990; 
Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999; Boschma, 2004; Irawati and Charles, 2010). 
The key challenge for attempts at furthering indigenous growth lies in the forging of 
links between firms of different Keiretsu. Although links between Keiretsu members 
(internal links) are well developed, the very nature of the Keiretsu makes that links 
between them (external links) are scarce (Gerlach, 1992; Irawati and Charles, 2010). The 
effort of the Indonesian government is aimed at creating these external links, between 
firms but also between firms and a range of heterogeneous agents in the regional 
knowledge infrastructure. This would strengthen the organising capacity of the region, 
which may be defined as the ability of a region to enlist all regional actors in idea 
generation and policy implementation for sustained economic regional development 
(Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999). The strong focus on internal links and the weak 
development of external links render the organisational capacity of the region 
underdeveloped. Given the preoccupation of the leading Japanese firms with their 
respective Keiretsu, the Indonesian government now sees a need to act as network broker 
to bring people and firms together (MOSR, 2002; MOTIRI, 2005). It has encouraged the 
Indonesian government to assume roles that include not only traditional government 
policy but also those usually performed by the private sector. For example, the 
Indonesian government not only uses tax incentives, credit provision and set-up and 
R&D infrastructure, but it also actively tries to establish subcontractor partnerships, and 
is involved in efforts to strengthen productivity and product quality of local 
manufacturing firms and furthering exports of these firms (Irawati, 2009).  
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4 The Learning Region model 
The Learning Region is one of several TIMs that aim to explain the relation between 
networks, learning and spatial proximity. Because the Learning Region has a stronger 
link to innovation policy than other TIMs (Hassink, 2001), we choose it to assess the 
efforts of the Indonesian government to initiate indigenous growth. More so than other 
TIMs, the Learning Region connects “the concepts of the network approach … – like 
interactive innovation and social capital – to the problems of regional development” 
(Morgan, 1997, p.492). However, the subsequent conclusion that interactive creation of 
(tacit) knowledge in regional networks is the key to regional economic development is 
shared by the other TIMs (Oerlemans et al., 2007). In the words of Lorenzen, TIMs 
“share a vision of (small) firms as dependent of support from the region, in relation to 
extra-regional knowledge sourcing. The region is understood largely as local networks 
and institutions. The global scale is seen as inaccessible for small firms, and without the 
region they would not be able to innovate and compete in the global economy. In this 
way, the region is seen as determining the development, innovation and competitiveness 
of firms” (Lorenzen, 2008, p.540). Although the Learning Region is more of a theoretical 
construct than something that is actually observed (Boekema et al., 2000), it offers an 
analytical tool to explain the potential for economic development of a region based on its 
capacity for learning and innovation. The more a region conforms to the theoretical 
construct, the better its perspectives for indigenous economic development. This section 
identifies the key analytical characteristics of the Learning Region.  
The Learning Region, like other TIMs, stresses that “regional economic success is 
heavily based upon territorially defined assets derived from ‘unique’, often tacit, 
knowledge and competitive assets, and stresses the importance of spatial proximity in 
collective learning processes” (Hudson, 1999). Consensus in the literature on a definition 
of the Learning Region is limited to this general level (cf. Morgan, 1997; Hassink, 2001; 
Rutten and Boekema, 2007a). When it comes to actually identifying the characteristics of 
a Learning Region, the task becomes more challenging and it may be difficult to 
distinguish the Learning Region from other TIMs (Rutten and Boekema, 2011). 
Consequently, the Learning Region is often described in terms of an ideal type, which, in 
turn, has led to the criticism that it is a normative concept (Hassink, 2001). Rutten and 
Boekema (2007b, p.138) identify three key characteristics of the Learning Region, that is 
spatial proximity, regional interfirm networks and the regional institutional set-up. Based 
on Hassink (2001) a fourth characteristic may be added to this list, regional innovation 
policy, since the Learning Region has a more intimate association with policy than other 
TIMs (Morgan, 1997; Hassink, 2001; Rutten and Boekema, 2011). In an ideal typical 
Learning Region these characteristics would be met in the following way. Spatial 
proximity refers to both ‘traditional’ agglomeration advantages and to the importance of 
spatial proximity for collective learning. This means that a Learning Region has a 
substantial concentration of economic activities to produce externalities (i.e. traditional 
agglomeration advantages). In addition, frequent interaction between co-located 
economic agents creates shared norms that may facilitate collective learning (Morgan, 
2004). The regional interfirm networks characteristic refers to both the structure and the 
nature of regional networks. Regional networks in a Learning Region are extensive  
in that they include many regional actors, such as firms, knowledge centres and 
intermediary organisations, and that they are also linked to actors outside the region (the 
structure of the networks). But, regarding to their nature, regional networks are also flat 
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and flexible rather than hierarchical and exclusive, since that is most conducive to 
interactive learning (Uzzi, 1997; Hudson, 1999; Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999; Rutten 
and Boekema, 2007b). The institutional set-up of a region refers to the presence of public 
and private research centres and the presence of intermediary organisations who can act 
as knowledge brokers between knowledge centres on the one hand and the regional 
business community on the other hand (Morgan, 1997). Not only does a Learning Region 
count a variety of high-level knowledge centres but they are also well-connected to  
the regional business community, if necessary through the help of intermediary 
organisations. The final characteristic, regional innovation policy also consists of two 
elements. Not only has a Learning Region a policy to further innovation among regional 
firms based on what Hudson (1999) calls its territorial assets, it also has a capacity for 
institutional learning. That is regional actors, such as government, the business 
community, knowledge centres and intermediary organisation, form a network that 
develops a strategy for regional innovation and development (Hassink, 2001). In a 
Learning Region, the regional actors have the capacity to revise this strategy to changing 
needs and demands (Morgan, 1997). 
The above characteristics apply to the Jabotabek region in varying degrees. The 
region has definitive potential to benefit from traditional agglomeration advantages, 
considering the substantial number of firms and other economic agents it hosts. In fact, 
Indonesian government policy to cluster automotive companies on specific industrial 
estates in the region was partially motivated by the promises of agglomeration 
advantages. The spatial clustering makes the services provided by research and 
vocational education centres, financial institutions, etc. more efficient (Irawati, 2009). 
Spatial proximity also facilitates collective learning in the Jabotabek region. The long-
term relations in the Japanese Keiretsu have a distinct personal element, and spatial 
proximity made it easier to maintain close personal relations between the various firms, 
which contributed to the substantial level of trust and knowledge exchange in these 
relations (Irawati, 2009). The network characteristics of the Jabotabek region have been 
discussed in detail earlier in this paper. The structure of the networks is one of dense 
linkages within the various Keiretsu in the region (the internal linkages), but few linkages 
between them (the external linkages). The nature of these networks is basically 
hierarchical in that the Japanese carmakers exercise considerable formal and informal 
control over the Keiretsu members and that knowledge flows are mainly top-down 
(Irawati, 2009; Irawati and Charles, 2010). In other words, the networks in the Jabotabek 
region are only partially developed and hence do not provide a good basis for indigenous 
regional development as advocated by the Learning Region. 
Regarding its institutional set-up, the region hosts several knowledge centres that 
specialise in automotive-related knowledge (see Table 2). Although their level of 
knowledge is generally good, their connections to the automotive industry are sparse. 
The main reason for this, of course, being the emphasis on Japanese knowledge and its 
top-down dissemination through the Keiretsu. This goes for technology development as 
well as vocational education. As a result, the Jabotabek knowledge centres are involved 
in only a handful of knowledge creation and innovation projects in the automotive 
industry (Irawati and Charles, 2010). The situation with regard to the intermediary 
organisations is somewhat better in so far that the automotive industry has organised 
itself in Gaikindo (The Association of Indonesia Automotive Industries). According to 
their website, Gaikindo’s mission is “To become a world-class, professional and 
independent automotive organization, which plays an active role as the government’s 
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equal partner in developing the industry to be adept at competing in the international 
market” (www.gaikindo.or.id). Gaikindo membership, though, is made up mainly of 
Indonesian subsidiaries and branch plants of the Japanese, European and US carmakers. 
Gaikindo is certainly a valuable instrument to further the interests of the Indonesian 
automotive industry, both domestically and in the ASEAN region but its power vis-à-vis 
the Keiretsu is limited (Irawati and Charles, 2010). Other intermediary organisations, 
such as financial organisations, engineering bureaus, innovation relay centres, are 
available in the Jabotabek region, but their success is limited. The explanation for this is 
not unique to Indonesia; instead, it troubles intermediary organisations all over the world. 
Those firms that can potentially benefit most from the services of intermediary 
organisation are often not sufficiently developed to clearly articulate their knowledge 
needs to the intermediary organisations. These firms are the so-called ‘jobbers’, who 
basically limit themselves to working on demand as subcontractors for larger firms. They 
have little or no engineering capacity of their own and must work according to 
specifications and blueprints provided to them by their clients (Rutten, 2003). Given that 
Indonesia is a developing economy, the proportion of jobbers is higher than in, for 
example Europe and North America. This makes the model adopted by many European 
regions to further knowledge dissemination among regional SMEs less feasible for 
Indonesia. In many European regions, networks were forged between intermediary 
organisations and manufacturing SMEs working as suppliers for large companies, as part 
of their regional innovation strategies. These networks are particularly helpful for the 
dissemination of managerial knowledge and they facilitate collective learning among 
SMEs with the intermediary organisations acting as ‘connectors’. However, the European 
SMEs involved in these networks are usually beyond the level of a jobber (Morgan, 
1997; Morgan and Nauwelaers, 2003). An additional difficulty for the intermediary 
organisations is that they have to compete with the Japanese carmakers, which makes the 
forging of regional networks difficult, since the Japanese carmakers prefer to keep SME 
networks limited their respective Keiretsu (Irawati, 2009). 
Table 2 Automotive knowledge centres in the Jabotabek region 
Knowledge Centre Location 
University of Indonesia Jakarta 
ITB (Institute of Technology Bandung) Bandung 
Polman Astra-Automotive Polytechnic Jakarta 
LIPI (The Indonesian Institute of Sciences) Jakarta 
BPPT (Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology) Jakarta 
BTC (Business Technology Centre) Jakarta 
Source: Authors’ research 
On the final characteristics, regional innovation policy, the Jabotabek region is found to 
have a clear and well-defined innovation strategy. Strictly speaking, this is more a 
national than a regional innovation strategy. However, the Indonesian national 
government designed this strategy specifically for the automotive industry in the 
Jabotabek region. This is different compared to regional innovation strategies in Europe, 
which are almost exclusively developed by regional governments (or administrators). 
The idea behind this is that regional governments are much more familiar with the 
specific needs, challenges and opportunities of their region (Morgan and Nauwelaers, 
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2003). However, the competence level of European regional governments is comparable 
to that of their national governments, something that may not be the case in developing 
economies (Gwyne, 1990). The national-driven innovation strategy for the Jabotabek 
region may thus benefit from the competence level of the national government. Given 
also that the seat of the national government, Jakarta, is part of the Jabotabek region, 
government responsiveness to regional circumstances seems to be accounted for. 
Developing an institutional learning capacity for the automotive industry in the Jabotabek 
region may be more problematic given the position of the Japanese carmakers. They 
follow the interests of their respective Keiretsu first of all and seem to be in no hurry to 
develop a capacity for indigenous economic development (Irawati and Charles, 2010). 
Instead, the Japanese perspective on regional economic development is one of a division 
of labour between the various ASEAN regions where they have established their 
Keiretsu. In this perspective, the Japanese mainland regions are the forerunners and the 
various automotive regions in the ASEAN area the followers. Depending on their level of 
(technological) development, the various ASEAN regions have a more or less prominent 
place in the Japanese-led hierarchy. This enables the Japanese carmakers to allocate 
investments in those regions where it may contribute most to the overall benefit of their 
respective Keiretsu (Irawati, 2009; Irawati and Charles 2010). But it does not necessarily 
benefit the development of the individual regions. In fact, automotive industry in a region 
that has a potential for indigenous growth may be much harder to control since this 
industry has development options other than those under the Japanese umbrella. 
Consequently, those companies in the Jabotabek region that could potentially make a 
meaningful contribution to developing an institutional learning capacity may be less 
inclined to do so given their position in the Keiretsu system and the resulting loyalties to 
the Japanese carmakers. 
Table 3 Learning region characteristics for the Jabotabek region 
Spatial proximity 
Agglomeration advantages Large number of firms in the region. 
Collective learning Regional networks insufficiently developed. 
Network characteristics 
Network structure Many linkages within the various Keiretsu, few 
linkages between them. 
Nature of network relations Network relations within the Keiretsu are 
hierarchical. 
Regional institutional set-up 
Knowledge centres Sufficiently present but servicing Keiretsu rather 
than regional development. 
Intermediary organisations Insufficiently networked to the region’s SME. 
Regional innovation policy 
Government policy The region has a clear strategy for its automotive 
industry. 
Institutional learning The dominant Japanese carmakers follow their own 
interests first of all. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The Java automotive industry 219    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
5 Summary and conclusion 
The Jabotabek region seems to be at a crossroad in its economic development strategy. 
On the one hand, it is the top-down growth model of the Japanese Keiretsu, which offers 
access to much needed Japanese managerial and technological knowledge in return for a 
dependent position. On the other hand, it is the indigenous growth model of the Learning 
Region for which the region is probably not yet sufficiently developed. Given the status 
of Indonesia and Jabotabek as a developing economy, the Keiretsu strategy has been a 
very sensible catching-up strategy thus far. Because of it, the Jabotabek automotive 
industry transformed from a cheap labour industry to an internationally exporting 
industry. Trickle-down effects from the Japanese subsidiaries and branch plants to local 
Indonesian firms and the wider regional economy have contribute to job growth and 
economic development of the Jabotabek region. As argued, this strategy has serious 
downsides as well. The developmental interests of the Japanese carmakers are limited to 
their respective Keiretsu. This means that Indonesian firms play a specific role in the 
Japanese hierarchy and the knowledge that is disseminated to them is tailored to this role. 
However, a broader knowledge base is required for these companies to transform into 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) or main suppliers that can play a more 
independent role. Moreover, knowledge spillovers largely remain limited to the 
companies directly involved in the Keiretsu. Even though job growth in these companies 
has wider beneficial effects in the regional economy, these effects will quickly evaporate 
in case the Keiretsu face economic difficulties. This became all too obvious in the 
downturn in the automotive industry in the mid 2000s. Therefore, an alternative regional 
economic development strategy needs to be implemented. 
It is obvious, though, that the Jabotabek region is not (yet) a Learning Region and it 
is therefore questionable that the region be capable of indigenous economic development 
carried by Indonesian firms. In order to do so, the local firms must upgraded first. It is 
here that the Indonesian government can play an important role in forging temporary 
networks on innovation, such as product development, as European examples have show 
(Morgan, 1997; Lagendijk and Rutten, 2003; Morgan and Nauwelaers, 2003). Several 
European regions have been successful at initiating innovation projects for SMEs. The 
aim of these projects – which vary widely in scale and scope – is not only to development 
new products and thus strengthen the competitiveness of the SMEs involved but also, 
more importantly, to forge networks between SMEs and to teach SMEs new managerial 
skills that are needed to manage their network collaborations (Lagendijk and Rutten, 
2003). In such a context of regional networks, it is more likely for SMEs to strengthen 
their technological competences. Government can attempt to forge SME networks 
through innovation projects by partially subsidising the costs involved. Innovation is 
risky and SMEs may not have the resources to carry that risk. Government subsidies may 
then be helpful. If research centres and larger companies can be involved in such projects 
it encourages knowledge transfer to SMEs. Additionally, the larger companies may be 
the buyers of the new products that the SMEs have developed. The larger companies can 
even participate in the product development. Examples of two successful such projects in 
the Netherlands are discussed by Rutten (2003) and Rutten and Oerlemans (2009). Such 
projects do not initially contribute much to the region as a whole. But if the Indonesian 
government were committed to a long-term development strategy, they could in this way 
help to create a number of more advanced SMEs in the Jabotabek automotive industry 
that are capable of conducting product development on their own. These companies, in 
turn, may be expected to form the nucleus for indigenous growth. 
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In sum, the most substantial obstacle against indigenous growth in the Indonesian 
automotive industry seems to be the lack of regional networks. Automotive firms are part 
of international Keiretsu rather than of a regional production system. Given the 
dependence of Indonesian firms on their Japanese patrons, they are not likely themselves 
to initiate a move towards indigenous development. The Indonesian government, based 
on a long-term policy, can transform the Jabotabek region into a Learning Region by 
forging innovation networks between regional SMEs and to link these networks to 
research centres and larger firms. 
Moreover, this paper suggests that contrary to the TIM-argument, as summarised by 
Lorenzen (2008, p.540), regional SMEs may have an alternative to knowledge-based 
development, innovation and competitiveness in the form of FDI. In fact, given its 
current level of development a Learning Region strategy is not feasible for the Jabotabek 
automotive industry. Consequently, this may suggest that a Learning Region strategy 
requires a level of development that developing economies may not yet have reached.  
If that is true, it means that in the early stages of knowledge-based development, 
developing economies may not have a choice between FDI and indigenous growth 
strategies. Instead, they would be dependent on FDI for the transfer of knowledge to 
reach a threshold before they can embark on knowledge-based indigenous economic 
development strategies. As argued, this is at odds with the claim of the Learning Region 
and other TIMs that the interactive creation of tacit knowledge in regional networks is at 
the basis of knowledge-based economic development. This paper thus raises questions as 
to the applicability of the Learning Region and other TIMs in the context of developing 
economies. The paper suggests that FDI can be an alternative knowledge-based 
development strategy, albeit one with limitations in case knowledge-based development 
based on regional networks is not feasible. FDI may lead to path-dependent economic 
development based on foreign knowledge. The knowledge base thus acquired may not be 
broad enough to generate indigenous growth, and regions may find it difficult to broaden 
their knowledge base because of their dependency on foreign MNEs. Nonetheless, 
regional SMEs may still embark on a trajectory of knowledge-based development and 
strengthen their international competitiveness accordingly. After all, the Jabotabek firms 
have developed into suppliers of parts and subassemblies to other automotive regions in 
Southeast Asia. This potential limitation of the applicability of the Learning Region 
within the context of developing economies seems to have been overlooked in the 
literature, and it poses a challenge for the further development of this concept. 
Knowledge-based economic development of a region may be more complex than the 
Learning Region and other TIMs suggest. This paper points at the important role of 
extra-regional networks with regard to interactive learning and the problematic way in 
which the Learning Region and other TIMs have thus far dealt with them. 
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Notes 
1 According to data from Gaikindo (The Association of Indonesian Automotive Industries), 
Toyota, Daihatsu, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Honda and Nissan had a market share of 89.3% in 2009 
up from 88.4% in 2005. 
2 Figures from the Indonesian Ministry of Industry. 
